There are exceptions, of course, to this generalization about lack of long-term 3 perspective: Goldstein (1988) springs to mind.
Other positive-feedback mechanisms include ideas and ideologies --even today 4 economic historians invoke the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism when teaching their graduate students about the Industrial Revolution.
Both of these tasks are discharged by Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner in their 5 chapter in this volume. disciplinary colleagues are prepared to treat as fixed. In economic history this reflects the long time frame over which the relevant processes unfold; variables that are realistically regarded as predetermined in the short run cannot reasonably be taken as invariant over longer intervals. While this long-run perspective is less central to international relations, there is a similarly a desire to relax the assumption that structure is impervious to change. For 3 example, international relations has in common with economic history a predilection to treat institutions as endogenous. Institutions being one source of positive feedback and lock in, it follows that the two subdisciplines share a fascination with path dependence. At the same 4 time, both subdisciplines pay a price from partaking of this unusually rich intellectual menu, namely, the difficulty of formalizing their models with the parsimony of other fields. That, of course, is what makes our chosen subjects so interesting and rewarding.
In organizing my discussion, I take as my starting point contributions to international relations which most closely parallel mainstream economics. I then describe other research in IR that bears less resemblance to conventional economics. But I do not provide a chronological account of the development of the literature. Nor do I attempt to identify geopolitical events that worked to discredit popular approaches and encourage new ones.
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A topic which is the subject of Mastanduno's chapter in this volume. 6 And I do not focus on the special role, if any, of economic issues in international security questions. 6 The most telling difference between IR and economics, I argue, lies in the connection between theory and empirical work. The argument is not the common one that the strength of economics is the existence of a core of theoretical assumptions, most notably utility and profit maximization, which provide the basis for graduate instruction, serve as a common intellectual language and are the point of departure for even the most unconventional research programs.
Rather, it is that the strength of economics is the complementary and mutually-supporting character of theoretical and empirical work. The core of commonly-accepted assumptions that unifies much research in modern economics did not descend like manna from heaven or spring full-blown from the brilliant minds of Marshalls and Samuelsons past. Rather, the assumptions and models that have survived and become part of this common theoretical core are those which deliver testable propositions that find systematic support in the data.
In IR, in contrast, the connections between theory and empirical work are relatively loose. Theory-based propositions do not lend themselves comfortably to empirical verification and refutation. Empirical techniques do not develop to the same extent to facilitate tests of theory-based propositions. As a consequence, research in international relations has not converged on a core of common theoretical assumptions and an arsenal of commonlyaccepted empirical techniques. If this view is correct, then the task for international relations is to strengthen the connections between theory and empirics.
See for example Rogowski (1989) . 7 See Frieden (1991) . 8 
II. Theoretical Perspectives
To a surprising extent there are parallels in economics for even the most unconventional approaches in IR, and vice versa. I make this point through a review of the interest, institution, and idea-based theories of international relations.
A. Interest-Group Models
For an economist (see for example Baldwin 1985) , the natural point of departure for thinking about a country's foreign policy is the interests of constituencies. Individuals will favor or oppose policies depending on how they perceive their welfare to be affected. The problem then becomes to identify interests. When the issue is foreign economic policy, the obvious basis is models of economic welfare in which interest groups are synonymous with factors of production (capital or labor) or with the sectors on which they depend for their livelihood (import-competing versus export-oriented, traded-or home-goods-producing). To explain a country's foreign trade policies, some political scientists have utilized the two-factor, two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, which predicts that a country's relatively abundant factor of production will favor a liberal trade policy (since that factor is used intensively in the export-oriented sector), while the scarce factor will favor a restrictive policy (since it is used intensively in the import-competing sector). Others have used the three-7 factor, two-sector Jones-Mayer-Mussa model, which predicts that the factor used exclusively in the export-oriented (import-competing) sector will favor (oppose) free trade, while the attitude of the factor used in both sectors will depend on its consumption basket. Other 8 A recent synthesis of this work is Milner (1988). 9 See Irwin (1995) , Irwin and Krozner (1996), and Frieden (1997) .
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A point recognized by Nagel (1975. 11 Newer work, like the common agency models of Grossman and Helpman (1995) , go 12 some way toward capturing these considerations, but it is not yet clear that they can be insightfully applied to international relations. Nor can this approach easily explain why policies develop discontinuously. Take the case of European integration, which has proceeded in fits (continued...) models provide other predictions, but the general approach --tracing policies to interest groups and interest groups to underlying structures --is fundamentally the same.
9
The strength of this approach is its precision and parsimony. It has been used to conceptualize the political economy of issues like trade and currency policies and has provided the basis for empirical work attempting to verify or reject the theory's core predictions. A 10 corresponding difficulty is that it becomes harder to map interests into policies and to test the corresponding propositions when noneconomic issues are involved. It may be that international diplomacy has only oblique and diffuse impacts on economic outcomes narrowly defined. If one assumes that individuals care only about economic welfare, then it is still possible to rely on off-the-shelf models of the factoral or sectoral distribution of income, however small the impact of policy on income distribution. But if one believes that individuals care about security policy because they value security, or that they care about power politics because they value power, then mapping from policy to interests, and conversely, is problematic.
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A further limitation of this approach is that it does not capture the nitty-gritty of politics. One simply counts the population in, say, the import-competing and export-oriented sectors without worrying about the incentive to organize and lobby. Finally, there is the 12 -6 -(...continued) 12 and starts, with long periods of stasis punctuated by spurts of intense integrationist activity. Although the stance of policy has shifted dramatically, the sectoral composition and factor endowments of the European economy and the interest group pressures attributable to those structures have evolved only gradually. There was no obvious change in the balance of special-interest influence between 1985 and 1987, for example, when the Single Act was passed, or between 1990 and 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed. It is hard to explain the pivotal events in the evolution of the European Union in terms of the interest group model strictly construed, in other words. I return to these issues below.
See for example Garrett and Lange (1995 The notion that institutions attenuate incentive problems associated with delegation encourages a functionalist perspective on their evolution (see e.g. Keohane, 1984) .
Institutions, in this view, exist to play an efficiency-enhancing role. For those schooled in economic theory, this conjures up the image of competition among rival political arrangements. Inefficient institutions that allow excessive principal-agent slack will be amended by dissatisfied publics. Those which allow inefficient outcomes to persist will be competed away by better systems, in the same way that inefficient firms will be competed out of business. However crude this formulation, a considerable literature on, inter alia, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union embraces this perspective.
It is easy to be sympathetic to functionalist interpretations, which provide a straightforward explanation for the evolution of political institutions. At the same time, there is reason to think that many social arrangements were created for reasons only remotely related to their current function. Once the die is cast, arrangements became locked in. Because they are resistant to change, they lend policy a strongly path-dependent cast. Yet another possibility is that institutions are purposely structured to resist change.
Their role is to serve as commitment technologies that prevent opportunistic behavior by those in power. Were it easy to modify a rule that certain policies could be adopted only by unanimity or supermajority, for example, that rule would lose its force. Institutions are structured so to make overturning such rules difficult, which works to lock them in. In turn, this increases the tendency for institutional arrangements that might have had efficiencyenhancing effects under the conditions that characterized their creation to outlive their usefulness.
Given the existence of so many competing interpretations of the role of institutions, it is not surprising that there exists wide disagreement on their characterization. At a more See Simmons (1994) and Garrett (1998) It is revealing in this connection to recall how the notion of institutions giving rise to path-dependence became an accepted concept in economics. Arthur and others had for some years undertaken analytical work on the subject but with little impact on the profession as a whole. Significant impact resulted only when David (1985) used the model to study a particular empirical problem, namely, the design of the mechanical typewriter. In painstaking detail he showed how the connections between a variety of institutions --secretarial schools, all of which had the incentive to teach the same typing skills as their competitors so as to maximize their market share; law and accountancy firms, all of which hired from a common pool of secretaries and none of which had an incentive to invest in their acquisition of firmspecific typing techniques; and manufacturers, who were forced to hire salesmen similarly It is further revealing that David had been asked to demonstrate to the economics 17 profession, in the meeting at the Allied Social Sciences Association Meetings that was the basis for his article, the uses of history in economic analysis. Rather than giving an abstract talk he chose to focus on a specific bit of empirical work. Liebowitz and Margolis (1990) have subsequently challenged the generality of the notion of path dependence by --revealingly --disputing David's empirical work. This too illustrates the point: analytic concepts rise and fall not on the basis of the elegance of the underlying model but largely as a result of the normal scientific process of marshalling empirical evidence, which includes attempts to replicate the results of prior investigators.
lacking specialized skills and therefore incapable of demonstrating the effectiveness of anything but a standardized keyboard --caused one of many viable keyboard configurations to become locked in. He did so by taking a standard problem in economics, the choice of 17 technology, and modifying the canonical model in small but far-reaching ways. In doing so he demonstrated that institutions, time, learning, and lock-in could in fact be built onto an existing analytical infrastructure without forcing scholars to choose between pursuing these ideas and tossing out the entire corpus of accumulated knowledge. The key to the advance was that it was empirical and incremental --in other words, it was normal science. Abstract theorizing was progressive because it was linked to normal empirical work.
C. Endogenous Preferences and the Role of Ideas
The interest-group and institutional approaches, as I have sketched them, assume that agents know their preferences and know the strategies that are appropriate for advancing them. For an economist, a striking feature of the international-relations literature is the existence of a strand of work which rejects this fundamental assumption.
Contributions to this literature reject the notion that constituencies and their political agents know their self-interest. Self-interest is more difficult to define when the issue is power, security and a country's place in the world rather than money in the bank; it is a socially-constructed concept that has no existence outside its specific context. And even when individuals, interest-groups and institutionally-empowered lobbies have a clear sense of their objectives, they may lack an understanding of mechanisms for achieving them in a complex world. Thus, simple economic models of utility maximization in the presence of perfect information may not plausibly carry over to issues of international security and diplomacy.
If preferences are incompletely formed or means of achieving objectives are incompletely understood, there is scope for mechanisms to formulate social priorities and identify strategies for pursuing them. Simplifying strategies (Tetlock and McGuire 1986) , historical analogies (Jervis 1976) , cultural predispositions (Kier 1995) , epistemic communities (Haas 1992) , and policy elites (Ikenberry 1993) have been offered to fill this void. Tetlock and
McGuire characterize policymakers as "limited capacity information processors" who use rules of thumb in lieu of full optimization. Haas similarly questions whether state actors understand the system in which they operate and whether rational choice is therefore the most appropriate framework for studying their actions, and highlights the role in policy making of networks of professionals with recognized expertise and competence, who provide depictions of social processes and the likely consequences of actions. Those who constitute these networks instruct officials about how to conceptualize their self-interest and how to enhance their welfare through strategy. Ikenberry argues that, on technical issues in particular, experts can contribute to the development of a consensus about feasible and desirable social goals.
The contributors to Hall (1996) show how policy outcomes are shaped by the interaction of ideas, on the one hand, with the orientation of the governing party, the structure of the state and state-society relations, and the nature of political discourse, on the other. McNamara "Ideas do not float freely," in the words of Risse-Kappen (1994) . For a particularly 18 clear statement of this view, see the introduction to Goldstein and Keohane (1993) .
There is an analogy with the way "cheap talk" (communication without commitment) 19 (continued...) (1996) describes how an alliance of technical experts and policy entrepreneurs can create a policy consensus when inherited conceptions are ripe for rejection as a result of poor policy performance. Goldstein and Keohane (1996) similarly argue that ideas shape outcomes when they take the form of world views ("principled or causal beliefs") that clarify actors' visions of goals and means-end relationships.
Ideas, ideology, and elite consensus, are not alternatives to the institutional approach, of course. They must be formulated, transmitted, received and amplified by a sociallyconstructed conveyance mechanism --an "institution" in the words of Jepperson, Wendt and Kazenstein (1996) . As Garrett and Weingast (1993, p. 176) Background papers by in-house analysts inform their proceedings, defining the parameters of discourse and decision making. The written record and recollections of permanent staff allow these processes to endure beyond the terms in office of any particular set of elected officials. can facilitate cooperation among firms in an imperfectly competitive market (Farrell and Rabin 1996) .
See e.g. Simon (1986) . striking is not only the absence of a single psychological alternative to rational choice, but also the absence of a clear set of theories or hypotheses about the importance of psychological distortions of rational decisionmaking or the conditions under which those distortions are likely to be found." A partial exception to this generalization is work that has sought to contrast the predictions of utility theory with those of prospect theory. But, by my reading, this attempt to formulate a coherent, refutable alternative hypothesis has been less than convincing.
There are obvious parallels between this literature and work in economics on bounded rationality. It is revealing that the latter has never really taken off in the sense of being 20 widely applied to concrete questions. In part the problem is that the conclusions derived from theoretical models are sensitive to small variations in specification, making it difficult to derive robust implications. A more fundamental problem is that work on bounded rationality has not generated testable, refutable propositions that can be systematically confronted with data.
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Similar criticisms can be levied against the international relations literature on "endogenous preferences." The "idea of ideas" is intriguing, but it is not clear how to
formulate it in a testable way. Is it rejectable? Can its explanatory power be systematically compared with that of alternative hypotheses? Can it be modeled formally with the goal of determining its internal consistency and drawing out its less obvious implications? Can it be synthesized with other literatures, like that on game theory, for example, so that not only can preferences be endogenized but their implications for strategic interaction can be systematically pursued?
D. Implications of the International Dimension
By definition, international relations differs from the rest of political science by its concern with the interaction of sovereign states. Even those scholars who are most heavily committed to the view that foreign policy outcomes are driven by domestic interests would admit a role for those same factors in foreign countries and therefore for interactions between them. The positions taken by governments in international negotiations depend in part on the positions of their foreign counterparts. How hard governments push for a particular objective will depend on how hard their foreign counterparts push back. Bargaining among nation states may be critically important for outcomes, in other words. For self-evident reasons, the literature in which these issues are emphasized is known as "intergovernmentalism."
Analyses of bargaining between governments typically use game theoretic tools to model the choice of strategies. Modeling this interaction forces the analyst to think systematically about incentives and tactics and about the likely reaction of other states. The problem with game-theoretic models is that they generally admit of a multiplicity of solutions, requiring further assumptions to select an equilibrium. In addition, the institutions which aggregate interest-group pressures at the national level drops from sight when attention turns to the strategic interaction of governments. The literature on two-level games (Putnam 1988, Evans, Jacobsen and Putnam, 1991) seeks to combine the game between governments and their constituents with the game between countries, but the caveat in the preceding sentence continues to apply.
I say "mainly" rather than "solely" because there have been some attempts to extend 22 the intergovernmental model to allow for international interactions through other channels, as I describe momentarily.
To pursue this example, it is widely argued that the institutions of the EU possess 23 sufficient autonomy to shape European policy outcomes; this is nothing more than a scholarly statement of popular complaints about the EU's "democracy deficit." And in the same way that principal-agent slack allows national politicians to do more than merely reflect the preferences of their domestic constituents, it can allow transnational institutions to do more than reflect the preferences of national governments. understandings through the mechanisms described at the end of Subsection B. By transmitting information more or less smoothly and making it easier or harder for others (in the present context, other countries) to respond consistently, they can alter the incentives for individual players (Morrow 1994) .
There is an analogy with the literature in economics and economic history on trade in the absence of legal enforcement (Greif 1994, Milgom, North and Weingast 1990 ) --on how "a dense social network leads to the development of informal structure with substantial stability" (to quote North (1991), p. 38) . There the problem is ensuring conformance with the terms of a contract in the absence of an enforcement mechanism. Solutions are found in repeated interaction in the context of an institutional setting that encourages certain norms of behavior, takes recourse to impartial arbitraters to verify that those norms have been met, and that encourages other traders to impose sanctions on those who fail to display the expected forms of behavior (by refusing to transact with them further, banishing them from the venue where transactions take place, withholding certification of their wares, etc.). This work has helped to establish how traders can be encouraged to keep to the terms of an agreement in the absence of legal enforcement, with obvious implications for how countries can "cooperate under anarchy" (Oye 1986 ).
While the occasion for this symposium is the fiftieth anniversary of International
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Organization, for purposes of the paragraphs that follow, it is even more appropriate that 1998, when this article will presumably appear, is the fiftieth anniversary of Morgenthau's Politics among Nations.
itself to systematic empirical verification, hindering the emergence of a strong analytical consensus.
E. The Level of Analysis Problem
Fifty years ago the parallels between the theorizing in international relations on the one hand and microeconomics on the other were even more pronounced than today. Realists which it is enough to assume that firms behave "as if" they maximize profits; it is unnecessary to "open the box" and explore their inner workings. Economists rationalized the assumption 26 on the grounds that, in a competitive market, firms which do not maximize profits will be driven out of business, leaving a residual population whose behavior will satisfies the premise.
Subsequently, scholars devoted considerable effort analyzing international relations at higher and lower levels. At a higher level this is the question posed by Waltz (1979) , of whether the system has its own dynamics. The analogous question in economics is whether one can learn something about behavior or its consequences by studying the macroeconomy rather than individual households and firms. Economists in fact possess models where one learns from aggregation --where the dynamics of the whole are more than the sum of its
parts. An example is the paradox of thrift, in which individual households or firms, by attempting to save more, end up saving less because more saving means less demand and lower incomes in general equilibrium.
But these models, while confirming that there are gains to be made from studying dynamics at higher --systemic --levels, do not in fact relieve one of the need to understand the behavior of individual households and firms. Indeed, they require particular assumptions about household and firm behavior (a positive constant marginal propensity to save, for example), as well as assumptions about the structure of the system (the economy is closed to international transactions, wages are fixed, etc.), whose validity is an empirical question. The problem with the Waltzian formulation is that it poses the system level as an alternative to analysis of individual countries. In a sense, macroeconomics went through a similar phase, in which One is reminded of the first macro-model, built by Bill Phillips of Phillips-Curve 27 fame, which consisted of a series of receptacles connected by pipes and filled with water to be used to analyze aggregate supply and demand hydraulically.
The relevant literature is surveyed by Smith (1988) .
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On the evidence, see Hogarth and Reder (1986) . International relations specialists concerned with lower levels of analysis have similarly questioned whether much can be learned using models based on the assumption that countries act as if they maximize the welfare of the median voter (as simple interest-group models posit). They question the assumptions of rationality and maximizing behavior that undergird game-theoretic analyses. Their qualms have counterparts in economics --in the literature on 28 psychology and economics in particular. But while anecdotal evidence, studies of market efficiency, and results from experimental economics all provide some evidence of deviations from rationality, utility maximization and productive efficiency, analysis has not pushed much beyond that point. For purposes of illustration, consider the literature on international debt.
29 Guttentag and Herring (1985) invoked the psychology-and-economics literature in arguing that disaster myopia leads commercial banks to lend excessively to developing countries. But
Mostly toward game-theoretic models in which banks and governments each seek to 30 maximize their own objective functions, but where problems of commitment and collective action make the Nash equilibrium sub-optimal.
In addition to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , one might mention Williamson (1975) in 31 this connection.
subsequent investigators found it difficult to model that behavior and draw out its less obvious implications. In the end, the strand of work based on insights from psychology and economics stalled, and the literature on debt developed in other directions. The same can be said of 30 other attempts to apply the psychology-and-economics literature: speculation is fun, analysis is difficult. The approach has not lent itself to normal science.
Others question not the assumption of rationality but the commonality of motives within countries and the absence of transactions and communications costs. The literature on bureaucracy and foreign policy (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1954, Allison 1971 ) which explains outcomes in terms of bureaucratic interactions has relaxed these assumptions productively.
This is very much the spirit of developments in microeconomics over the last 50 years. Once upon a time economists analyzed markets by assuming that firms act "as if" they maximize profits, but the discipline has devoted its attention in recent years almost entirely to incentive problems within firms and to how units of production organize themselves internally. There 31 is no question that it could be similarly productive in principal to analyze the internal organization of foreign-policy-making bureaucracies. The problem, as Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (this volume) note, is that the bureaucratic-politics literature, like that based on cognitive psychology, has succeeded in developing few testable propositions. And the few hypotheses it has generated, such as the notion that bureaus are interested in maximizing the size of their budgets, have not withstood empirical scrutiny.
III. An Application to European Monetary Unification
In this section I apply the perspectives developed above to the case of European 
A. Interest-Group Models
The logical starting point for an analysis of these developments is interest-group politics. Some interest groups are intrinsically more concerned than others with eliminating exchange rate volatility and uncertainty. Firms with strong international ties evince a particular interest in exchange rate stability. Banks and corporations that invest throughout the European Union will be interested in intra-European exchange rate stability in particular.
More generally, producers of tradable goods with EU-wide markets should be averse to currency fluctuations in general and competitive devaluations in particular. Conversely, producers and consumers of nontraded goods will display relatively little interest in exchange rate stability or monetary unification.
This perspective points to economic integration as the force behind the monetaryunion project. As the post-World War II integration has proceeded, the number of companies and banks that value exchange-rate stability has climbed. The share of Europe's trade that stays within the continent has risen from 40 to 60 per cent of the total since the mid-1960s.
While the explosion of cross-border direct foreign investment (DFI) was delayed (partly by the fact that controls on capital flows were maintained for longer than controls on trade), by the 1980s DFI was growing at impressive rates. Frieden (1996), p.211. 32 Some argue, echoing the literature on multinational enterprises dating from the early 33 1970s, that the development of transnational interest groups (transnational financial, business and labor coalitions in particular) accelerated the translation of this interest into policy. Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) argue for the importance of these transnational interest groups, Moravcsik (1991) against.
See e.g. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) , Frieden (1996) , Bayoumi and Eichengreen 34 (1997), and de Boussieu and Pisani-Ferry (1998) . An institutional variant of the interest-group argument can be found in Garrett (1997) .
There is the further problem that some economic models in fact suggest that DFI will 35 render multinational firms less concerned about currency fluctuations, not more. To the extent that a change in the exchange rate reduces the cost of producing in one country relative to another, a firm which produces in both will be better hedged than one which undertakes production at only one site. See Cushman (1988) .
As documented in Eichengreen (1996). 36 The argument, then, is that "the greater cross-border mobility of goods and capital Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996) .
whether to peg to the deutsche mark, dollar or yen, a dilemma which might have otherwise tempted them to peg to no one at all. Unfortunately, it is not hard to cite other countries that also grew increasingly dependent on a single trading partner or group of partners and yet moved away from exchange-rate pegging (Canada and Mexico vis-à-vis the United States spring to mind).
To the extent that reductions in transportation costs and improvements in communications and information technologies stimulated cross-border transactions, there is no reason to think that they should have lent the greatest impetus to trade over short distances (in this case, between neighboring European countries). In fact, growth in the share of intra- This argument is made in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) . Frankel and Rose 38 (1996) provide another variation on the theme, in which countries whose business cycles move together prefer stable currencies (on optimum currency area grounds), and stable currencies cause their business cycles to move together.
monetary integration, and dependence on international transactions) without identifying the exogenous factor behind their co-movement.
B. Neofunctionalist Spillovers
The interest-group argument, with the driving force of the European Community appended, suggests that the customs union and the Single Market accelerated the process of monetary integration by shifting the political balance between producers of traded and nontraded goods. It altered the balance of power between those favoring and opposing exchange-rate stability. An appeal of this argument is that it illustrates the operation of Haasian neofunctionalist spillovers. It provides a mechanism by which the integration of goods and capital markets, achieved through the creation of a European customs union, spilled over to the monetary domain. It suggests a virtuous cycle of positive feedbacks: since currency stability encourages trade and factor mobility as well as the other way around, there will be mutually reinforcing spillovers in both directions, lending European integration a strongly path-dependent character.
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It is possible to point to several sources of spillover. One is the linkage between the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and monetary integration. The goal of the CAP, the European Community's first substantive achievement, was to stabilize the domestic-currency prices of agricultural commodities through a system of variable levies and subsidies. Changes in intra-European exchange rates were highly disruptive to its operation. According to See also McNamara (1992) . Market mattered not just by shifting additional pressure groups into the free trade camp and undermining the flexibility of narrow bands but also by heightening the sensitivity of sectoral interests to currency fluctuations. (These arguments are elaborated in Eichengreen and Ghironi 1996) . Currency instability (more specifically, the "competitive devaluations" problem) threatened to erode support for the Single Market by shifting the locus of competitive advantage and rewarding beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Insofar as the Single Market was a valued objective, exchange-rate stability was seen as necessary to solidify political support. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) , the need to defend the CAP against the corrosive effect of Creating deliberate linkages as a strategy for encouraging progress was a theme of 41 Nye (1971) .
The empirical corollary is that countries which removed capital controls should have at the same time become stronger proponents of monetary unifications, since proceeding as before (with the pegged-but-adjustable exchange rates of the EMS) was no longer feasible.
The problem, of course, is that all members of the European Community ratified the Single Act at the same time, leaving little room for identifying variation. To be sure, countries phased out controls at different rates, providing some identifying variation, although this may reflect their comparative ease of running independent national monetary policies, which may itself be a function of structural features of their economies, structural features that could be correlated with preferences toward monetary integration for independent reasons. It is revealing of the complexity of this empirical analysis that it does not appear to have been undertaken.
C. Linkage Politics
Some have argued that the Single Market was important not just because it promoted trade but because it was a stepping stone toward more important goals such as political integration. Germany was ready to accede to French pressure for monetary unification, the intergovernmentalist argument goes, only because France was prepared to agree to meaningful steps toward political integration, which Germany desired in order to obtain an expanded foreign policy role in the context of an EU foreign policy. The fact that EU member states had taken significant steps toward political integration by ratifying the Maastricht structural preconditions that allowed the Franco-German alliance to credibly threaten to proceed without Britain "intergovernmental institutionalism," following Keohane.
And there is the further problem that monetary integration in Europe has proceeded 43 discontinuously, as emphasized in a similar context by Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) . One might attempt to salvage the simple interest-group model by arguing that it would have delivered monetary integration in a more linear fashion, with steadily increasing economic integration delivering progressively greater intra-EU exchange rate stability, had exogenous disturbances like German economic and monetary unification not disrupted Europe's financial markets and efforts to achieve policy convergence. This attempt at salvation seems rather tortured; in particular, it seems strange to treat German unification as entirely exogenous to the integration process with which we are concerned. absence of strong theoretical guidance for how to identify the relevant interest groups, there is a tendency to specify the model in a way that is not refutable. It is always possible to identify interest groups that favored and opposed a particular initiative, and in the absence of strong theoretical pointers to the null hypothesis, it is tempting to simply assert that their influence must have been key.
D. Ideas, Ideology and Policy Entrepreneurship
Political scientists were not slow to fill the gaps in the interest-group model. Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) In contrast to the assumptions underlying game-theoretic formulations, then, neither national leaders nor their constituencies "possessed the intellectual means to foresee alternative outcomes, much less rank them" (Sandholtz and Zysman, p.107ff) . The See Pauly (1992) . As it turned out, this commitment was not worth the paper it was 44 written on, although this was not fully appreciated until 1992. See Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) .
preferences of national leaders and their constituencies were incompletely formed, providing scope for them to be shaped by an entity like the Commission. The mechanism it used was a series of technical measures designed to create a fully unified internal market. The successful implementation of theses measures in turn created further integrationist momentum.
In their discussion of the structural conditions that opened the way for the The role of policy failure and reinterpretation is also evident in McNamara's (1996) analysis of European monetary integration. According to McNamara, the solidification of the Hall (1993) makes the same argument for Britain.
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It is tempting to appeal to this new policy consensus as a focal point for coordinating 46 the strategies of policy makers in a situation of multiple equilibria. This analogy, developed by Goldstein and Keohane (1993) and Garrett and Weingast (1993) , is not entirely satisfactory from the perspective of an economist. The problem is that game-theoretic models with multiple equilibria and focal points assume stable, well-defined preferences, where players do (continued. ensure that EC outcomes are as close as possible to its national interests, but the crucial point is that those national interests are defined in the context of the EC...In other words, the national interests of EC states do not have independent existence; they are not formed in a vacuum and then brought to Brussels. Those interests are defined and redefined in an international and institutional context that includes the EC. States define their interests in a different way as members of the EC than they would without it."
This approach emphasizing incompletely-formed preferences or incompletely formed understandings of the strategic environment is widely applied by political scientists to the question of European monetary unification. Interests motivate decision making, but, when the issue is something as confusing and complex as monetary integration, they cannot be taken as fully formed from the start. Institutions transmit the influences that help nascent preferences to coalesce.
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However appealing this synthesis, it is hard to know how to operationalize it absent a methodology for calibrating its explanatory power relative to alternatives. Those who advocate the interest-group view can pose their arguments in a refutable way (formulating hypotheses of how, inter alia, the magnitude of foreign trade and investment should be correlated with economic policy decisions), and offer formal statistical tests of their arguments, as Frieden (1996) has done in the context of European monetary unification.
Those who argue for the importance of institutions can and have done likewise. Those who emphasize the role of ideas continue to have considerably greater difficulty in systematically operationalizing their approach.
IV. Conclusion
Scholars in international relations possess a rich portfolio of theories, hypotheses and interpretations of the factors shaping the interaction of nation states. Some of these will be familiar to economists, including those which take nations as unitary actors whose governments seek to advance the national interest and use game theory to study international interactions; those which disaggregate nation states into interest groups who dictate governments' policy decisions according to the median voter or adding machine models; and those which focus on institutions in shaping domestic and international interactions. Other approaches --those concerned with ideas, norms, regimes, for example --will appear more novel. Either way, few economists will question that research in international relations is now informed by a rich variety of suggestive analytical approaches -if anything, a richer menu of theories than mainstream economics itself.
But what international relations lacks from the perspective of economics is close connections between theory and empirical work. It lacks systematic, standardized ways of bringing data to bear on those theories. It lacks a standard methodology with which to assess their explanatory power. The case study remains the dominant testing ground for alternative approaches. As shown in Section III of this paper, this can be a weakness as well as a strength. Case studies are useful for illustrating the practical applicability of abstract reasoning, but they are crude instruments for discriminating among alternative hypotheses and rating their relative explanatory power. Because individual cases, in their richness, are complex, they can always be interpreted in terms of several alternative analytical approaches.
And because explanatory variables are correlated, interpretations in terms of one that omit all reference to others will suffer from omitted variables bias and run the risk of spurious correlation. This danger follows inevitably from the case-study approach, since the limited number of cases any one scholar has the energy to master offers limited degrees of freedom for systematic tests.
From the perspective of economics, the task for scholars in international relations is to develop other ways of more formally, systematically and rigorously testing their theories, presumably by pooling cases across countries or over time and taking advantage of the institutional variation in that expanded data set. Having said this, it is important to emphasize that a call for more empirical work should not encourage those who engage in the search for theory-free patterns in the data. Empirical work that degenerates into mindless empiricism will not be progressive, while empirical work that is theory-linked will push the field forward.
It is important to avoid the tendency in economics to take this approach too far by disregarding hypotheses that are not easily quantified and tested and by neglecting one-of-akind events whose analysis is not conducive to the application of a general theory or a general test. It is hard to imagine a field of international relations in which unique situations (World War I, Nazi Germany, post-World War II European integration) were excluded because there existed an inadequate group of other, somehow comparable, situations on which to base cross-section analyses.
